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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As amplified below, Erin's argument on appeal suffers 
from several substantive infirmities: 
• Contrary to Erin's suggestion, this is not a 
case involving any retroactive application of 
the law. On remand, the trial court was 
ordered to review the evidence leading to the 
alimony award and make more detailed findings. 
The trial court expressly found that it had 
miscalculated the spousal maintenance for the 
first three years and that Tom had overpaid 
Erin by $108,000.00. The issue is whether the 
record substantiates the trial court's 
rationalization for allowing Erin to keep that 
windfall — not whether evolving principles of 
common law should be given retroactive effect. 
• Under the applicable standard of review for 
alimony awards, the Court must affirm as long 
as there is evidence in the record which 
reasonably supports the trial court's 
determination of living expense need. Erin 
cannot simply "wish away" the corroborative 
exhibits and testimony at trial, by arguing 
that she would have used a different strategy 
for calculating her expenses if she had 
realized then that she wasn't legally entitled 
to get a cut of Tom's future income as part of 
her property settlement. The notion that she 
was wrongfully denied the opportunity to 
relitigate the issue of her living expense 
need is specious: This Court remanded the 
case for more detailed findings on the alimony 
award — not for a new trial. 
• Erin cannot be permitted to reargue that the 
alimony award should be altered so that the 
parties future incomes are "equalized." That 
is not the purpose of spousal maintenance, as 
this Court determined in the first appeal. 
• Finally, Erin misconstrues the legal elements 
of alimony awards and attorneys' fees awards 
in dissolution actions. In each case, the 
responding spouse's ability to pay is a factor 
which comes into play only after the 
petitioning spouse's actual financial needs 
have been established. At that point, it may 
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be a reason for limiting the final award; and 
it is never used as a basis for increasing an 
award above the petitioning spouse's actual 
financial needs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Decision to Reduce Erin's Alimony is 
Supported by the Evidence and by Adequate Findings. 
The trial court originally awarded Erin alimony of 
$10,000 per month for the first three years, to be reduced to 
$5,000 per month for the next three years, after which alimony 
would terminate. R.O.A. 382-383, 402. In the first appeal, 
this Court held that the trial court's findings were 
insufficient and remanded the case so the trial court could 
specifically address Erin's employability, the justification 
for reduction in alimony, and Tom's ability to pay. Chambers 
v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah App. 1992). In addition, 
this Court directed the trial court to reconsider the 
inclusion of the children's expenses in the alimony award, 
something which is described as "plainly inequitable" to Tom. 
Id. at 843, n.l. On remand, after making the additional 
findings based on certain evidence in the record, the trial 
court recalculated the alimony and concluded that it should 
have originally been $7,000 per month for the first three 
years, and reduced to $3,000 per month after that. R.O.A. 
732, 923-924, 929. Erin has appealed that part of the Order 
on Remand, on the grounds that there was "no reasonable basis" 
for reducing the alimony and that the order was "not supported 
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by adequate findings." Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 
19, 29, 33. 
As the record shows, the trial court's Order on Remand 
decreasing the alimony was reasonable and supported by 
adequate findings. In its Order on Remand, the trial court 
made the following Findings of Fact: 
3. In reconsidering the alimony award in the 
original Decree, it occurs that there were 
miscalculations. 
4. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 correctly 
reflected the needs of the plaintiff and her 
children at about $10,000.00 per month. That 
amount failed to consider her additional need of 
health and accident insurance (previously provided 
by the defendant) and money to offset her tax 
liability for her receipt of alimony. 
5. The Court recognized there were 
substantial children's expenses involved in the 
Exhibit 11 needs assessment, but those expenses 
would be approximately offset by the fact that the 
child support nearly equalled the amount of 
children's expenses alleged on Exhibit 11 and the 
$4,500.00 child support was included in the income 
calculations. 
6. In recalculating the alimony, if the 
Court accepts the expenses of Exhibit 11 and adds 
the expenses of health and accident insurance and 
taxes on the alimony paid and then deducts the 
child support, that means the plaintiff has need of 
about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior standard of 
living. 
7. The estimated $7,000.00 for the plaintiff 
to maintain her prior standard of living does not 
factor into any consideration of the plaintiff's 
ability to provide for herself or money received as 
returns on investments from assets awarded to her 
as part of the property division. 
10. Plaintiff was thirty years of age at the 
time of trial. She testified that she had two and 
3 
one-half years of college and that she held certain 
jobs previously, including teaching dancing, 
working in window display and as a clerk at ZCMI 
and a clerk at Stop & Shop. She also testified she 
helped manage some apartments. Plaintiff also 
testified that she had not made any attempts to 
obtain any employment outside of the house. The 
evidence also showed that plaintiff participated in 
many types of physical activities and there were no 
reasons, health or otherwise, why plaintiff could 
not be fully employed and contribute to her own 
needs. Plaintiff could have found appropriate 
employment which would provide at least a minimum 
wage income of $736.00 to assist in providing her 
own needs. 
13. The Court figures with a four percent 
return on her investment base, the imputed income 
of $736.00 and the child support, the alimony 
should be reduced at the end of three years to 
$3,000.00 per month. 
R.O.A. 923-926 (emphasis added). 
The foregoing findings set forth a "reasonable basis" for 
the trial court,s recalculation of the alimony award for the 
first three years and reduction of alimony thereafter. They 
are adequate under the law because they are "sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue 
was reached." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah 
App. 1988). Erin cannot overturn them simply because she 
disagrees with the way in which the evidence was weighed. 
However, the trial court did exceed the mandate of this 
Court when it reversed itself (without any evidentiary basis) 
and ordered that alimony would not terminate after six years. 
See Appellants Brief at 17-24. On remand, the trial court 
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should have limited itself to further explaining its original 
order reducing alimony and its reference to the "substantial 
income from nsset s liidi nave been awarded to [Erin]." 
"Further explanation" was what- ^ i « Court had mandated, 
nothing more. Chambers, 840 P.2d 843. 
I ri 11o1 t\ i"i s w ti i: i nq b r 1.1 . u aoes not oppose Tom' s 
argument (or supporting legal authority) that the trial court; 
exceeded its jurisdiction on remand on this issue. Moreover, 
Erin does not root radirt Tom'1* (*1 'it eroents that: (1) Mr'. 
Abold's testimony about Erin's net investment income was 
unopposed at trial; (2) Mr. Abold's calculations already took 
into consideration the taxes on Kriiv's Investment base; (3) 
there was no evidence of a 4% rate of return; and (4) there 
* evidence that the family loans were uncollectible. 
Thus, the trial coui t. * i: order extending the alimony 
indefinitely has been shown to be based completely upon 
unsubst diitiated and unproven assumptions outside the record. 
When the trial court corrected JIs mistake on the alimony 
calculation, and determined that alimony should have been 
instead of $10,000 per mont; became 
apparent that Erin had received an overpayment ry 
totalling $108,000 plus interest. The issue before the court 
wa i lint whel her to make the reduction in the award for the 
first three years prospective — three years had a.l ready passoii 
by the'4' T^e issue, in Judge Taylor's own words, was how to 
deal w > < : . : s ^ iue, -J overpayment [to 
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Erin]" and whether "[t]o require plaintiff to repay those 
overpayments . . . ." R.O.A. 766-67 (quoted at page 15 of 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief). Tom appealed from the 
decision not to order such repayment. See Appellant's Brief 
at 11-17. 
Erin has presented no legal, factual or equitable 
justification which supports the trial court's decision to let 
her keep the overpayments. See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's 
Brief at 35-38. Erin implicitly concedes that the 
overpayments are Tom's post-decree separate property to which 
she has no legal claim. The trial court expressed the feeling 
that repayment would "somehow seem unfair," because the family 
debts (part of Erin's investment base) were probably 
uncollectible. R.O.A. 766-767, 924-925. By her silence, Erin 
concedes that this assumption is absolutely without factual 
support in the record. Tom also challenged the trial court's 
unsupported conclusion that repayment would seriously affect 
Erin's ability to maintain her standard of living and 
undermine her investment base. This was pure speculation, not 
supported by logic or any evidence in the record. Erin has 
not shown it to be otherwise. 
The "retroactivity" cases cited by Erin are red herrings. 
This is not a case where the trial court "retroactively" 
applied some change in the common law. It is a case where, 
confronted with the deficiencies of its findings of fact, the 
trial court "corrected" certain errors on remand. 
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IT. Erin is Not Entitled to an Increase in the Alimony Award, 
Erin argues that "the trial court should have increased 
the alimony rather than decreased it" and requests this Court 
t o r e m a n d t h e c a s e with direction!1!,. ' f 
award that would provide her a true and equitable standard of 
living." Appellee/Cross-Appellant 7s Brief at 31, 4 3 Erin's 
arguments are improper. Er I n I n s i s t s t. 11 a t bee a u s e Tom # s 
future contract payments were held not to be a marital asset 
subject to axvxsxon, she should have received a larger alimony 
award i n the i nterests of equalizing the disparit i. her and 
Tom's post-decree incomes. £d. at 19. This is exactly the 
sane ar g umei it wh i ch Erin briefed and argued in the first 
appeal (See Appellant's Brief, dated 11/7/91, at 3 0 - 3 9 ) . It 
was rejected then, see Chambers, 840 P. 2d at 842-43, and that 
r e j e c t i o i i i s re s judicata i i ow Th I s C on ir t a f f irmed the 
decision that Tom's future contract earnings were not subject 
to division, and i t d i d not direct the trial court to 
reconsuk'i I he awdi'd of Alimony in light oil that holding. 
Essentially, Erin is arguing that the trial court erred 
by relying upon Erin's own Exhibit 11 to set alimony because 
(a) Kxnilut n was not "the maximum1 of net support request, 
and (b) It was not representative of her marital standard of 
living. Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 26, Erin asserts 
that at trial and in the first a p p e a l , she Iliad argued that if 
Tom's future contract earnings were not marital property to be 
divided, then she would want more alimony. Id. at 19, 27. 
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However, Erin's trial counsel never put on evidence at trial 
of how much additional alimony she was claiming. At trial, 
the issue of division of Tom's future contact earnings was 
hotly contested. Erin's trial counsel knew there was a chance 
Erin would not be awarded part of Tom's future earnings. It 
would have been a simple matter for him to present an 
alternative exhibit showing a claim for "X" amount of 
additional alimony. 
Erin's trial counsel made a tactical decision not to do 
so. On appeal, Erin's new counsel complains that Exhibit 11 
did not reflect her true living expense need and made no 
provision for "health insurance/1 "extended travel", "tax 
preparation", "expensive gifts for the children", or "real 
estate or stock investments." Appellee/Cross-Appellant's 
Brief at 28-30. First, that is directly contrary to Erin's 
testimony that Exhibit 11 was very close (within $500) to the 
living expense need for herself and the parties' children. 
Tr. II: 105-07. Second, even if there were deficiencies in 
Exhibit 11 and her trial counsel did not adequately present 
her proof at trial, Erin has no right to a second bite at the 
apple. Third, there was additional evidence presented in the 
record from which the trial court could determine the parties' 
marital standard of living: Tom presented evidence that the 
entire Chambers family had enjoyed a comfortable standard of 
living on an expenditure of approximately $12,000 per month. 
Tr. IV: 109-11; Defendant's Exh. 25. 
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Contrar •' to Mr in' s present contention that the trial 
court did not consider her need tor "health insurance ,tf 
Exhibit clearly requested $736.20 per month for health 
costs. Ill inn, in I Im I>I*PICM> I hn trial court ordered: 
The defendant shall maintain such health, accident 
and dental insurance as is available to him through 
his employment for the minor children of the 
parties, and shall pay all uninsured medical, 
dental, eye care and orthodontic expenses by or on' 
behalf of the children. 
The defendant shall take all steps necessary to be 
certain that the plaintiff is able to secure her 
COBRA benefits to health insurance from the NBA for 
insurance protection for 36 months after the entry 
of this Decree. All such medical insurance 
premiums and expenses shall be paid by plaintiff. 
R.O.A. 403-404. Contrary present contention that 
the trial court die ; , i 
travel," "tax preparation" or "expensive gifts for the 
chi ldren," Exhibit 11 clearly requested $3,539.55 per month 
for "Clothing, Entertainment, Incident , rind an additional 
$3 00.00 per month for "Entertainment" and another $1,075.00 
per month for "Incidentals." Travel, income tax preparation 
and gifts were specifically listed in the attachments to 
Exhibit 11. See Plaintiff7s Exh. 1 2 Furthermore, the court 
s t a t c ci i iii 1:1" i • ? D e c r e e i 
It is acknowledged that defendant is paying child 
support in the amount of three (3) times higher 
than the maximum child support amount set forth by 
the child support schedule for three (3) children, 
and the higher amount is justified in allowing the 
children to share in the relative affluence of the 
defendant. 
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R.O.A. 403. Contrary to Erin's contention that the trial 
court did not consider Erin's desire to make investments and 
create a retirement plan for herself, the trial court was well 
aware that, by stipulation of the parties, Erin would receive 
$1,497,578 in cash and cash equivalent assets, and would have 
an income from the investment of those sums. Tr. IV: 2-3, 35-
49; Tr. Ill: 93-96; R.O.A. 385-393, 405-410. 
Just as she did in the first appeal, Erin argues that the 
alimony award should be reversed and remanded with directions 
to the trial court to bring into "parity" and "equalize" the 
parties' "future standard of living." Appellee/Cross-
Appellant's Brief at 28, 30, 34-35 (emphasis added). Just as 
she did in the first appeal, Erin asserts that Howell v. 
Howell, 806 P. 2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991) and Martinez v. 
Martinez, 818 P. 2d 538 (Utah 1991) support her position. Id. 
at 35. They do not. 
As Tom argued in the first appeal (Brief of 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant, dated 12/19/91, at 13-20), the true 
function of alimony is to permit the receiving spouse to 
maintain the standard of living enjoyed during marriage, and 
to prevent that spouse from becoming a public charge. English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). The Supreme Court 
has articulated three factors which are to be considered in 
deciding whether an award of alimony is justified. The trial 
court must consider: (1) the financial condition and needs of 
the spouse seeking support, (2) the ability of that spouse to 
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generate income, and (3) the abil i ty of the responding spouse 
to provide the support, id. The courts do not use alimony as 
a vchichci foi equalizing the* parties' future incomes. 
To the contrary, this Court has explicitly staled that 
"alimony may not be automatically awarded whenever there is 
disparity between the parties1 incomes." Bur t v. Burt, 799 
P. 2d 1166, 1170 (Utah App, 1990) (emphasis added). In the 
Gardner case, Judge Howe explained: 
We have said that the wife is entitled to enjoy as 
near as possible the same standard of living she 
enjoyed during the marriage and she should be 
prevented from becoming a public charge. English 
v. English. 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). But 
this is not the same as "equalizing" their incomes. 
The instant case is a good example. Mr. Gardner is 
a highly skilled surgeon earning $6,000 per month. 
Mrs. Gardner was not employed at the time of the 
divorce. She thought she could maintain the 
standard of living to which she had become 
accustomed if she received $1,700 per month 
alimony. If their financial positions after 
divorce are to be equal, she presumably should have 
$3,000 per month alimony. 1 do not think the 
majority intends that result , 
The object of divorce is to set the parties free of 
each other after an equitable division of property 
is made and, if needed, an award of alimony is made 
which will enable both parties to maintain as near 
as possible the standard of living they enjoyed 
during the marriage. The parties then go their 
separate ways and attempt to rebuild their lives. 
But because of the disparity in their earning 
ability, the wife here, who has training as a 
secretary but has not been employed for thirty-
three years, will never earn as much as her 
husband-surgeon. Our cases do not suggest that the 
divorce decree should attempt to cure this 
disparity by "equalizing" their future incomes. 
Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1083 (Utah 1988) (J Howe, 
concu i r J ny i»iid d i ssent i nq) ( emphasis added) . 
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This traditional two-step approach begins with an 
examination of the expenses generated by the parties' 
lifestyle during marriage and ends with the determination of 
whether any amount is needed to supplement the potential 
recipient's own income in order to remain "at a level as close 
as possible to that standard of living." See Gardner, 748 
P.2d at 1081; Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 
App. 1988); Howell v. Howell. 806 P.2d 1209, 1212 (Utah App. 
1991) . The goal is maintenance of the status quo, not 
ascendancy to new heights. 
As Tom pointed out in the first appeal, the Supreme Court 
has declined to recognize the equitable restitution approach 
which Erin endorses: 
The Court of Appeals' concept of equitable 
restitution cannot be sustained for three reasons. 
First, the concept of equitable restitution is 
based on the proposition that a failed marriage is 
a venture akin to a commercial partnership in which 
the spouses invest their time and effort solely for 
remunerative activities . . . In any event, the 
spouse's contributions cannot be reduced to a 
common denominator that allows for a valid 
comparison in monetary terms. Indeed, the very 
attempt to do so would interfere with the trial 
court's ability to achieve an equitable result 
based on the needs of the spouses in light of the 
monetary resources available. For example, if a 
spouse avoids his or her marital responsibilities, 
the partnership theory might result in denying that 
spouse any award of support or property at divorce, 
irrespective of his or her need and the other 
spouse's ability to pay. That is not the law. 
Martinez v. Martinez. 818 P.2d 538, 540-41 (Utah 1991) 
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court emphasized that the 
English factors provide an adequate framework from which to 
12 
fashion an appropriate award of alimony and that the award 
must have a relationship to the recipients need, in light of 
the standard of living the parties had during the marriage. 
Id. 
As in the first appeal, Erin again tries to bolster her 
"equal income" argument1 with the Supreme Court's statement 
that "in some circumstances" it may be appropriate for the 
trial court to make a "compensating adjustment" while dividing 
marital property and awarding alimony. Martinez, 818 P.2d at 
542. The facts of the present case do not fall within those 
limited situations contemplated by the Supreme Court: 
The cases which have refused to hold that 
professional degrees and practice constitute 
marital property subject to valuation and 
distribution have nonetheless assessed and divided 
the value of the degree or practice on the basis of 
other legal and equitable remedies. These cases 
follow a common fact pattern. Typically, the 
husband is supported throughout a long graduate or 
professional program by the working wife, and the 
couple is divorced soon after graduation. In such 
cases, there are few marital assets to distribute, 
1
 Erin's position is still essentially based on the factors 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Martinez: (1) the length of the 
marriage, (2) financial contributions and personal development 
sacrifices made by the spouse requesting equitable restitution. (3) 
the duration of the contributions and sacrifices during the 
marriage, (4) the disparity in earning capacity between the 
spouses, and (5) the amount of property accumulated during the 
marriage. Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 69, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), rev'd. 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). 
13 
and the courts have considered other ways of 
compensating the spouse. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1080-81 (cited for illustrative purposes 
in Martinez).2 
The Utah courts have consistently reversed alimony awards 
that appeared to be designed merely to equalize disparity in 
the parties' respective income levels rather than providing 
supplemental income necessary to meet the recipient's "living 
expense need." In Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 
1990), this Court stated: 
It is questionable from the record that this is a 
case warranting alimony in favor of defendant, 
whose substantial accumulated wealth and monthly 
income should permit her a standard of living 
comparable to what she enjoyed during the marriage. 
Rather, alimony was the device the court selected 
to narrow the gap between the parties7 incomes. 
Especially since nearly all income at issue in this 
case is simply the return on property interests, 
the court's approach was incorrect. Proper 
distribution of property interests of one sort or 
another should have come first, and only then would 
alimony need to be considered. 
Burt, 799 P.2d at 1170, n.3. Accord DuBois v. DuBois, 29 Utah 
2d 75, 504 P. 2d 1380, 1381 (1973) (trial court abused 
discretion in awarding alimony where "it appears that the 
income from the assets awarded to the plaintiff is sufficient 
2
 In Martinez, the wife had made substantial sacrifices to 
enable her husband to finish medical school, but the parties 
divorced before they could enjoy the higher standard of living 
permitted by his degree. Martinez, 818 P. 2d at 539. Because of 
this, the Supreme Court stated that "it may be appropriate" for the 
trial court to make a "compensating adjustment." Id. In the 
present case, where significant property had accumulated during the 
marriage and Erin had enjoyed a comfortable standard of living for 
many years, she has already shared in the economic benefits that 
have actually been realized. See Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1081. 
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to maintain her lifestyle in the manner to which she is 
accustomed without periodic payments from defendant") ; Jeppson 
v. Jeppson, 684 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1984) (alimony terminated 
where plaintiff's ability to perform some work plus assets 
available to her were sufficient to support her need). 
Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585 (Utah App. 1993) , which 
cites Chambers, does not support Erin's claim for more 
alimony. It stands for the proposition that an alimony award 
should maintain the receiving spouse "at a level as close as 
possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage." Godfrey, 854 P.2d at 589. There is more than 
adequate support in the record for the trial court's finding 
that Erin "has need of about $7,000.00 to maintain her prior 
standard of living." R.O.A. 923-926. The trial court's 
alimony award will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has 
been "a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion." Id. Erin 
has not shown that the trial court has abused its discretion 
in setting the alimony at $7,000 per month for the first three 
years and reducing it to $3,000 per month thereafter.3 
III. Attorneys' Fees Cannot be Awarded Because There is no 
Finding of Need. 
On remand, in determining whether Erin had the ability to 
pay her own attorneys' fees, the trial court found: "It is 
3
 There is no basis for Erin's claim that the child support 
should have been increased when the alimony was decreased. 
Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 25. The children's expenses 
erroneously included in the alimony award totalled approximately 
$4,783.36 per month. However, the parties stipulated to child 
support of $4,500.00 per month. 
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clear with the distribution of almost a million and a half 
dollars in assets, that the plaintiff could pay her own 
attorney." R.O.A. 735-736; 928, 930. Nevertheless, the court 
ordered Tom to pay some of Erin's attorneys' fees because it 
believed that taxes, family loans, and legal expenses would 
make "substantial inroads" into that investment base. In his 
opening brief, Tom has established that there is no evidence 
that the family loans were uncollectible. Erin does not 
contest this. Erin also concedes that the taxes were already 
taken into consideration by Mr. Abold, the expert who 
testified about Erin's investment base and calculated her 
investment income. Similarly, Erin fails to point to any 
evidence in the record which would support the trial court's 
conclusion that Erin's legal expenses would substantially 
erode her investment base. 
Erin likes to remind the Court that Tom's post-decree 
monthly income is "several times" greater than Erin's. Tom's 
income is irrelevant to a determination of Erin's ability to 
pay. In this case, the court found that Erin did have the 
ability to pay her own attorneys' fees. It was error for the 
court to order Tom to pay part of Erin's fees despite its 
finding of no need. 
In this appeal, as in the first appeal (see Appellant's 
Brief, dated 11/7/91, at 39-41), Erin argues that the trial 
court erred in awarding her only a partial reimbursement of 
her attorneys' fees. See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 
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42-43. That issue was disposed of in the first appeal. 
Furthermore, it is within the court's discretion to award less 
than the claimed amount of fees, as long as it has "reasonable 
justification." Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 
1991). Contrary to Erin's assertion, the trial court did 
justify only a partial award of attorneys' fees. In the 
Decree and in the Order on Remand, the court stated that ^ Erin 
could pay her own attorneys' fees in light of the million and 
a half dollars in assets she received. R.O.A. 396, 928, 930. 
IV. There is no Reason for an Evidentiary Hearing. 
Erin has asked this Court to remand this case with 
directions to the trial court "to conduct a hearing to 
adequately address the needs and circumstances of Mrs. 
Chambers and to fashion an alimony award that would provide 
her a true and equitable standard of living." Appellee/Cross-
Appellant's Brief at 43. In other words, Erin wants a new 
trial. She wants an opportunity to re-write Exhibit 11 to 
include more expenses, and she wants an opportunity to argue 
once again what she argued at trial and argued in the first 
appeal — that she should have received a larger alimony award 
because she was not awarded part of Tom's future contract 
earnings. See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 28, 30. 
Erin also wants an opportunity to put on evidence of her 
"true" investment base. See Appellee/Cross-Appellant's Brief 
at 33. Of course, at trial Erin could have presented her own 
evidence to contradict or supplement Mr. Abold's testimony 
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regarding her investment base and income, but she did not do 
so. In addition, she wants a chance to re-do the attorneys' 
fees affidavit presented at trial. Id. The parties had their 
trial. Erin is not entitled to re-try these matters in a so-
called "evidentiary hearing" on remand. 
At the June 7, 1993, hearing Erin raised these same 
issues regarding the future contract earnings, investment 
base, and attorneys' fees, and she requested an evidentiary 
hearing. The trial court stated: 
I don't see the necessity for the retrial of the 
case. I think that the Court has heard the 
evidence and the record is available to me. And I 
believe that the Court is able to follow the 
directions of the Court of Appeals in handing down 
a new Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree, relating specifically to the three issues: 
alimony, attorneys' fees and the division of the 
retirement. 
Hr. (6/7/93) at 54-55. The trial record was adequate for the 
trial court to follow this Court's mandate in the first 
appeal. Nothing has changed in that respect. There is no 
basis for this Court to order an evidentiary hearing. 
V. Erin Should Not be Awarded Attorneys' Fees on Appeal. 
Tom opposes Erin's request for attorneys' fees on appeal. 
If Tom prevails on the main issues in this appeal, Erin's 
attorneys' fees request must be denied. See e.g. , Hall v. 
Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1027 (Utah App. 1993). Even if Erin 
substantially prevails in this appeal, she should not be 
awarded attorneys' fees because she is not in need of 
financial assistance and she was only granted partial 
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attorneys7 fees at trial. See Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967 
(Utah App. 1994); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons expressed above, Tom requests that the 
Order on Remand be reversed in part, with the following 
instructions on remand: (1) that the trial court be directed 
to order Erin to reimburse Tom for overpayments of alimony in 
the amount of $108,000 plus interest; (2) that the trial court 
be directed to reinstate its original order terminating 
alimony payments after six years; and (3) that the trial court 
be directed to reverse its award of attorneys' fees to Erin 
and order Erin to reimburse Tom for previous payments in the 
amount of $22,500 plus interest. In all other respects, the 
Order on Remand and the Decree should be affirmed. In 
addition, Erin's request for attorneys' fees on appeal should 
be denied. 
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